Turkish-American Commercial Relations (1908-1930):
The Success of Trade-The Failure of Investment

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Abstract

Commerce had a prominent role in the Ottoman and later Turkish-American relations. The first agreements the American administration signed with Ottoman authorities in the late 18th century were aimed at assuring the safe passage of the US merchant ships through North Africa. After this initial acquaintance, a new era of Ottoman-American relations was established in 1830 when the US government concluded a trade and navigation treaty with the Ottoman government in Istanbul, resulting in the expansion of American activities in the region. During this time, the US generally ranked as the second-largest consumer of Ottoman exports, whereas American products dominated the Ottoman market during the Armistice Period. Despite the robust trade exchange between the two states, however, their commercial relationship was oft overshadowed by the era’s political and diplomatic tensions and the imperialist rivalry of the European powers prevented the US from making sizable and lasting investments in the region. This article, therefore, aims to analyze the commercial relations of these two countries and to present the reasons why bilateral trade did not end up in investments from the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908 until the inauguration of statist economic policies of Turkey in 1930. The study has made use of the American archives and foreign trade records as well as benefitted from Levant Trade Review, a publication of the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant in Istanbul.

Keywords: Turkish-American Relations, Ottoman Empire, Turkey, American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, Investment, Foreign Trade.

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Introduction

The relations between the United States of America and the Ottoman Empire (later Turkey) have more than two-hundred-year-old past and there are abundant academic studies on these relations. Although commerce had always a remarkable place in the bilateral relations, the political ties gained much importance particularly after the World War II (WWII) and this situation has also prevailed in the academic works. Furthermore, the American philanthropic and missionary activities in the region have attracted considerable interest by the academicians. However, the studies on commercial relations were limited especially regarding the era before the WW II. For instance, in this field, the thesis by Leland J. Gordon constituted the basis for most of the articles and academic works with its data, collected from the American foreign trade yearbooks (Gordon, 1932). Moreover, A. Üner Turgay authored a comprehensive article on the Turkish-American trade in the 19th century (Turgay, 1982) but the scope of the article was limited only to this period. Even though Gordon’s study covers the era from 1830 to 1930 and provided detailed data on the bilateral trade, it lacks the explanation of why Turkish/Ottoman-American trade relations did not expand into investments. Hence, this article aims mainly to present the Ottoman/Turkish-American commercial relations between 1908 and 1930; to investigate the reasons behind the failure of American businessmen and products in the Turkish market and to determine conditions that prevented the large-scale American investments in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

The year 1908 marked the beginning of a new era in Ottoman history, known as the Second Constitutional Period. The 1908 Revolution was welcomed by the Ottoman people and the word “liberty (serbesti-hürriyet)” swept through the Empire. Nonetheless, the international conjuncture did not present a suitable environment for the new Ottoman administration to maintain its territorial integrity. Beginning with the annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary and Crete by Greece, the dissolution of the Empire was accelerated by the Tripoli War (1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), which wrested the last African lands and rich Balkan territories from Ottoman sovereignty. A subsequent, fateful alliance with the Central Powers in World War I (WWI) resulted in the Allied occupation of Istanbul and the Anatolia; however, in 1919 a newly established National Movement launched a counter offensive and gradually succeeded in expelling the occupiers from Anatolia. In 1923, the ongoing wars and turmoil ended with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (Zürcher, 2017).

As a result of era’s optimism, the Ottoman administration initially adopted a capital-friendly policy by removing the regulative limitations on investments and encouraging private enterprise (Toprak, 2012). However, the Capitulations had effectively converted the Empire into an open market for the European powers and proved to be a formidable obstacle to the development of domestic Ottoman industries. The Unionist Regime of the Second Constitutional Era therefore had the aim of abrogating these agreements to form an independent economic system. Although the wars damaged the Ottoman economy, Allied entanglement in WWI enabled the Unionists to abolish the Capitulations and follow an independent national economic policy. This foreign capital-friendly economic approach was maintained during the War of Independence and the subsequently established Republic until the 1930s, when the Great Depression resulted in the “statism” era in Turkey (Boratav, 2013; Tezel, 1970a). During this era, the Ottoman Empire was still an agrarian economy and still imported nearly all manufactured products as well as some foods. Even though the republican regime increased industrial investment and production, the dominance of agriculture continued in the 1920s as well. Despite the expansion of Ottoman foreign commerce until 1910, perpetual wars and rising territorial losses prevented sustainable growth (Pamuk, 2007).

In contrast to the political and economic troubles of the Ottoman Empire, the United States of America was in the process of rapid development and commercial expansion since the end of the Civil War (1861-1865). This precipitous growth of industry, combined with the spread of railways, and the exploitation of vast mineral and agricultural resources across the country supported the expansion of American foreign trade. In addition to agricultural products which were exported to the world since the country’s founding, American manufactured goods started to gain a remarkable market share in South America, China and Europe. Particularly in the last decade of the 19th century, American industrial goods constituted a major share in American exports (Wright, 1990). As a result of this industrial development,
the US was in search of new markets and created policies to promote its access and influence abroad. The late-19th century Open Door Policy, for example, secured American commerce in China by preventing the Great Powers from imposing restrictions on international trade. In a similarly oriented approach, the Taft administration’s “Dollar Diplomacy” of the early 1910’s prescribed the extension of US interests in foreign countries through investments financed by American capital (Cullinane, pp. 35-66).

The first formal American-Ottoman contact was established in the 1790s when the fledgling US government sought an agreement with Ottoman North African rulers to assure the security of its ships plying between the Levant (Eastern Mediterranean) and American ports. Following this initial communication with the Empire’s provincial leadership, Captain Bainbridge’s visit to Istanbul in 1800 marked the first direct American contact with the Ottoman central government (Akçadağ, 2013). However, bilateral commercial relations were slow to develop and the first Ottoman-American agreement to outline an official framework for mutual relations and commerce could only be signed in 1830. Obtaining “most favored nation” status, the US started to extend its representation in the Empire and David Porter was assigned as the first American representative to Istanbul in the same year. It is also notable that some early interactions between the two countries were enabled by the involvement of American missionary institutions. Pioneered by Levi Parsons and Pliny Fisk in 1819, these religious initiatives spread across the Middle East and established extensive ties with the Empire’s non-Muslim people with the help of their 465 schools (Tekin & Göksal, 2017). In the 1870s, the Empire’s sizable arms purchases brought Ottoman-American communication to an all-time high; and the large attendance to the 1893 Columbian Exhibition by the Ottoman government created an opportunity to direct exchange between two communities (Şafak, pp. 159-167). However, relations were eventually tarnished by conflicts related to complaints from missionary institutions and the Armenian Events. This friction would continue to haunt bilateral relations between the two states until the re-proclamation of Constitution in 1908 (Erhan, 2015).

Although the relationship between the two states was rooted in commercial activity, bilateral trade would not become significant until the 20th century. The Ottoman Empire’s primary exports included wool, opium, licorice root, rugs, carpets, fruits, and nuts, while the US sold mineral oils, firearms and liquors (Gordon, 1932). The volume of trade was in fact quite negligible for both countries, but for some products, the US demand held vital importance. For instance, one third of the Ottoman opium exports was destined for the US, and, in the 19th century, American ships purchased large volumes of the Empire’s world-famous figs (Issawi, 1980). A decade before the 1908 Revolution, booming tobacco exports resulted in a rapid expansion of bilateral trade on the side of the Ottomans. This highly coveted agricultural product would maintain its prominent position in Ottoman/Turkish foreign trade for many years to come. In comparison to its exports, the Empire’s imports from the United States remained limited to agricultural implements, steel, and cotton manufactures, all of which amounted to approximately $150,000. In 1907, a year before the Revolution, the volume of mutual trade surpassed $16,000,000. Ottoman exports represented about $14,000,000 of this total, whereas American exports constituted only $2,000,000 (Gordon, 1932; U.S. Treasury Department, 1911).

Turkish-American Commercial Relations (1908-1930)

The restoration of the constitution in 1908 was welcomed by the US administration and business community. The new government in Istanbul was perceived as the harbinger of Ottoman economic development which would promise increased opportunity for American businesses. Spurred by the Taft administration’s Dollar Diplomacy, which encouraged American companies’ acquisition of governmental concessions and tenders abroad, US businessmen sought shares in the Ottoman naval expansion program and attempted to earn a concession for the Chester Project. American officials likewise intervened in these negotiations and promoted their compatriots before the Ottoman government. However, the failure of these projects disappointed the US government and prompted it to intensify its focus on alternative markets (China, South America) rather than struggling in vain to counter the strong European influence on the Ottoman trade and economy. This fading economic interest in the Empire and a turn to other markets can clarify US behavior during the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912). In this instance, the Ottoman government sought to purchase rifle parts from American companies, but the US government declined the sale under
the pretext that it would breach American neutrality during the war (Sander & Fişek, 2007, pp. 40-41). Yet when considering American aspirations to build warships for the Empire half a year earlier, the justification of neutrality appears inconsistent. Such an inconsistency indicates that another, more powerful motive, may have dominated the US foreign policy psyche. It should be noted that the trade volume exchanged between Italy and the US was five times higher than with the Ottomans, suggesting that the US’s ostensible dedication to neutrality may have served as a pragmatic protection of American commercial interests in both countries. Moreover, the American government had begun to follow a moderate policy in the region and sought to avoid confrontation with the European powers. Having worked tirelessly to gain a shipbuilding and arms supply contract from the Empire a short while ago, the American government’s attitude during the Italo-Turkish War can be interpreted both as a reaction to US exclusion from this large Ottoman naval program and as a protection of American business interests that depended on the maintenance of friendly relations with its much more commercially significant ally (To Secretary of State, 1912).

The American government’s business-oriented approach to navigating regional developments continued during the Balkan Wars as well. At the outset of the conflict, the State Department’s foreign trade advisors demanded the early proclamation of neutrality in order to assure the security of American commerce in the region (From Office of the Solicitor to Mr. Young, 1912). American involvement in the wars was limited to the dispatch of warships to the region with the goal of protecting American citizens in a possible Bulgarian occupation of Istanbul (DeNovo, 1968, p. 52).

During World War I, Ottoman-American relations continued until the United States’ entry on the side of the Allies in 1917 necessitated the cutting of diplomatic ties. During this period, relations between the two states may be qualified as relatively peaceful with the exception of American resistance to the abrogation of the Capitulations in 1914 and opposition against the Armenian Relocation of 1915. Since the establishment of bilateral relations, the US attached utmost importance to the safety of its citizens in the Empire and a long-term conflict between the two governments resulted from a differing interpretation of Article 4 of the 1830 Commerce and Navigation Treaty regarding the trial of Americans. Similarly, in 1914, the Ottoman government’s abrogation of commercial and judicial capitulations was met with stiff resistance from the American government which contested the annulation of its citizens’ judicial rights. It should be noted, however, that the Ottoman Empire showed higher tolerance towards Americans than towards citizens of other Western countries. For instance, “American” was given status as a separate language in order to circumvent the prohibition on English as a language of the enemy. (The American Language, 1915; Erhan, 2000).

Armenian Events were already damaging Ottoman-American relations since the 1890s and the missionaries who intensified their activities among the Armenians protested and agitated the events in the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, a short time ago before the entrance of the Ottomans into the Great War, a diplomatic crisis, which even included the American administration, arose when Ahmet Rüstem Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, DC, stiffly defended against the accusations of the American press concerning the Armenian Issue. As a result, Ahmet Rüstem Bey left the US upon this argument (Wasti, 2012, pp. 784-786). However, the Armenian Relocation of 1915 created greater problem between two governments particularly due to the approach of the American Ambassador Henry Morgenthau in addition to the missionary propaganda that influenced the American public opinion. The American government officially protested the relocation and started relief works in the region for the Jewish and Christian communities as well as the Armenians (Yılmaz, 2015, p. 30).

In 1917, the United States was finally driven to join the war alongside the Allies. While they did not declare war on each other, official diplomatic relations between the US and the Ottoman Empire were severed and it would take a decade for new ambassadors to be dispatched to Washington and Istanbul. In addition to the war’s diplomatic consequences, commercial relations would be disrupted by the obstruction of sea and land routes to the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, American missionary institutions in the Empire were, in theory at least, exempted from this diplomatic rupture. They continued to operate throughout the war years, but suffered serious losses (DeNovo, 1968, pp. 92-96).
With the end of the war and the signature of the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918, American-Turkish relations entered a new phase. The post-war period would mark the beginning of America’s direct involvement in reshaping the region by supporting the establishment of an independent Armenia and consenting to Greek occupation in İzmir. Moreover, American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which presented a general framework for peace after the war, proposed a solution for the fate of the Ottoman Empire as well. Wilson’s lauded set of principles prompted a movement in Turkey that called for an American mandate over the region. It was hoped that such a mandate would both preserve the country’s independence and offer support from an industrialist nation that did not harbor political ambition for the Empire’s lands and resources (Erol, 1972). Nevertheless, the United States would not yet assume such an active role in shaping European and Near Eastern affairs. The American Congress’s rejection of post-war treaties with the Central Powers and the election of Warren Harding as president of the United States resulted in a return of the government’s pre-war isolation and non-intervention policy as of 1921 (Yılmaz, 2015, p. 43; Özkan, 2016, p. 264).

In the meantime, the Nationalist Movement, headed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, launched a counter offensive against Allied occupation in the remains of the now-defunct Ottoman Empire. From 1921 onwards, the movement gained military and diplomatic accomplishments which fortified its case and position in Anatolia. As a result, the American commercial attaché Julian Gillespie was dispatched to Ankara in December 1921 to have talks with the leaders of the new government. This contact became the first official communication between the United States and the emerging leadership in post-Ottoman Anatolia. The content of these meetings primarily consisted of commercial interviews and Gillespie’s report described potential business opportunities ( Özkan, 2016, pp. 340-341). After the victory of the National Movement in September 1922, the Chester Project reappeared on the Turkish-American relations agenda. At the same time with the Lausanne Conference, the Ottoman-American Development Company, owner of the Chester Project, signed an agreement with the Turkish government for the construction of railways and ports and sought a monopoly on the importation of agricultural implements. The Ankara government likely consented to this agreement in an effort to gain the support of the US during the Lausanne peace talks (Armaoğlu, p.70). However, the US continued its position with the Allies and the new Chester Project failed due to the company’s inability to pay its liabilities and to the League of Nations’ decision to give Mosul to Great Britain (DeNovo, 1968, pp. 210-228).

The 1923 declaration of the Turkish Republic gave way to rapprochement efforts by the two governments and was thus accompanied by the signing of a separate Lausanne Treaty on August 6, 1923. However, US political conditions and public opinion, marred by the Armenian Issue and the loss of the judicial and commercial privileges furnished by the 1830 treaty, were unfavorable for Turkey and the treaty was eventually rejected by the American Senate in 1927 (Lippe, 1993). Nevertheless, the US government signed a modus vivendi to secure the maintenance of trade under equal conditions with the European countries and appointed Joseph C. Grew, former American Delegate to the Lausanne Conference, as the American Ambassador to Turkey. In the same year, Ahmet Muhtar Bey was assigned as Turkish Ambassador to the United States. The two governments signed the Trade and Navigation Agreement in 1929, which contained nearly the same conditions as the 1923 treaty and aimed to constitute an official basis for bilateral relations (Bulut, 2010, pp. 78-111; Armaoğlu, Belgelerle, p. 90).

Profile of Bilateral Trade

The 1908 Revolution inspired enthusiasm amongst the American public and American diplomats in the Empire alluded to an imminent resolution to political and economic problems and the creation of a favorable environment for American interests in the Near East (Erhan, 2015, p. 380). As an indication of the sincerity of these expectations, the American government supported companies by directly intervening in the talks for the Chester Project, which was first presented to the Ottoman administration in 1908, and in the negotiations for the Ottoman shipbuilding program in 1910. Moreover, the State Department ordered the full support of the American Embassy in Istanbul for both of these projects (From Wilson to AmEmbassy, 1910). The Chester Project consisted of an ambitious American plan that envisioned the construction of a 2000-kilometer long railway from Central Anatolia to the Mosul Province ( Vilayet) and the exploitation of
mineral resources along this line. However, the scope of the project was so expansive and ambitious that it 
ignited strong opposition from Germany and Britain as the former had concessions for the Baghdad Railway 
Line in the same region and the latter sought a share in the Mosul oil fields. Therefore, despite preliminary 
approval of the Ottoman government, British and German commercial aspirations for the Mosul oil reserves 
predicted to be a fatal hindrance to the project and it was eventually rejected by the Ottoman parliament in 1911 (DeNovo, 1959; Tezel, 1970b, for detailed information please see Demiryolundan Petrole Chester Projesi (1908-1923) by Bilmez Bülent Can).

In 1910, the Ottoman government started a shipbuilding program which included the construction 
of two battleships and the American Department of State invited relevant companies to bid for the tender. 
However, despite the intensive efforts of several American steel and shipbuilding enterprises and the 
continuous support of the US government, American companies failed to gain a share in the warships 
program, which was mainly to be furnished by the British (From Carter to Secretary of State, 1911). 
Moreover, the American companies also demonstrated a keen interest in the construction of gunboats and 
in the sale of arms and armor for these ships to the Empire. With such prospects in mind, the State 
Department endeavored to extend the trip of the Ottoman delegation assigned to visit the British and 
German shipyards in 1911, inviting them to the United States as well. The Ottoman Navy Minister ultimately 
decided on the additional visit, however, due to time constraints and the urgency of shipbuilding for the war 
effort (From Carter to Secretary of State, 1911). The failure of this first Chester Project attempt and the 
unsuccessful bid for a shipbuilding and armament sale contract dampened the enthusiasm of the American 
business community and dealt a blow to its burgeoning relationship with the Ottoman market. Ultimately, 
such failures resulted in the US government’s reluctance to interfere in contracts on behalf of American 
companies.

Despite the period’s myriad political conflicts and the US government’s avoidance of direct 
intervention in pursuing its commercial interests, the era was marked by the expansion of independent US 
business initiatives and overall bilateral. In 1911, American Consul General, Gabriel Bie Ravndal, founded 
the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, which began to distribute quarterly reports in Levant 
Trade Review covering American business in the region. Among the prominent companies to gain an early 
foothold in the Empire, Standard Oil installed its own distribution facilities in Izmir and established its Near 
East headquarters in Istanbul. Despite competition from Romanian and Batumi oil products, foreign trade 
statistics suggest that the company increased its sales in the region (Foreign Commerce and Navigation of 
the United States, 1908-1930). Furthermore, during this period, the American Emery Trust and the Western 
Electronic Company of Chicago brought their businesses in the Empire.

From 1908 to 1917, the Ottoman government’s liberal economic approach contributed to the 
development of American-Ottoman commerce and trade volume expanded from $13,000,000 in 1908 to 
over $25,000,000 in 1913, despite the Tripoli and Balkan Wars and the resulting territorial losses. This 
increase can be attributed to the rise of the Ottoman tobacco, opium and hides export and the American 
export of mineral oils, cottonseed oil and cotton manufactures (Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the 
United States, 1908-1930). Upon the outbreak of WWI, bilateral trade started to shrink, particularly after 
the Ottoman entrance into the war and the obstruction of ports in Istanbul and Izmir. Despite smaller 
shipments from alternative ports in Dedeagatch, Salonika, in the Balkans, and Urla, in Western Anatolia, 
trade volume declined to around $900,000 in 1916 (Smyrna Branch, 1915; Shipping Activity at Bulgarian 
Port, 1915; Aegean Ports, 1915). During this period, Ottoman foreign trade was directed primarily at its 
wartime allies, Germany and Austria-Hungary, and in 1917, about 70% of Ottoman products were destined 
for these countries (Eldem, 1994, p. 68). However, demand from these countries was primarily dominated 
by war-related needs, and as such, Ottoman agricultural products such as filberts and tobacco, could no 
longer be exported, whereas the demand for manufactured materials increased due to the impossibility of 
importation during the war (Market of Trebizond, 1915; Smyrna Branch, 1915). At the war’s conclusion with 
the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918, the American diplomats returned to Istanbul and commercial 
relations resumed under these conditions.
The Armistice Era (1918-1922) was characterized by conditions very different from those of the pre-war era Ottoman Empire and Istanbul. The Ottoman capital was under Allied control and Ottoman territory was divided into three different spheres of influence: the central Ottoman government in Istanbul and its vicinity, the Ankara government in central, eastern and northern Anatolia, and Greek and Allied occupation in Western and Southern Anatolia. Germany and Austria, which dominated the Balkans before WWI, lost their economic capacity, while the victorious Allies incurred severe economic and financial damages which would take time to repair. The Ottoman capital itself did not remain unscathed. Long dependent on surrounding agricultural regions for sustenance, it suffered a shortfall of vital resources as Romania, Russia, and Anatolia became gripped by economic and political crises. The United States, by this time an industrial and agricultural powerhouse, dominated the Istanbul market during the Armistice Era with its exports of flour, wheat, sugar, cottonseed oil, cotton, leather and iron manufacture as well as coal and mineral oils (illuminating and lubricating) which were imported to Istanbul in large quantities. In comparison, however, traditional Ottoman exports, such as tobacco, opium, fruits, nuts, hides and wool, were shipped to the United States in much larger quantities due to stocks accumulated during WWI. As a result, the bilateral trade volume rose to over $80,000,000 in 1920 and US exports to the Ottoman Empire exceeded the Ottoman’s sales to the US during this era. However, this situation depended mainly on the cumulative demand of the city in the post-war period, political instability in the region, and, more importantly, on the absence of European competition in the market. Thus, as of 1922, this relatively large trade volume rapidly plummeted until a year later, when Russia, Romania and Anatolia resumed their supply to Istanbul and the European Powers returned to the Turkish market with their higher financial capacity and lower-priced products (Gordon, 1932, pp. 61-62).

The declaration of the republic in Turkey heralded a new economic landscape with revised conditions that departed from the long-held trade conventions of the Ottoman Empire. No longer would the United States possess the capitulatory rights formerly assured by the Empire, and the judicial and economic privileges, which once allowed American citizens to conduct business and missionary activities in the region, were abrogated. As of 1929, the Turkish government withheld the right to determine its own customs duties, breaking with the impositions of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. Furthermore, the separation of many of the Empire’s territories obstructed American initiatives in the region. The Mosul oil reserves, for example, which constituted the most profitable zone in plans for the Chester Project, had been left to Iraq under the British Mandate. With its scope and commercial interests curtailed, the Ottoman-American Development Company was impelled to cancel its contract with the Turkish government, ending once and for all the aspirations for the Chester Project (Can, pp. 312-330). Despite this reorganization of power and territory, however, the Republic’s rapid development under the new administration also promoted new opportunities for the American business community. American participation in infrastructure, manufacturing, and exportation activities will be elaborated in upcoming sections.

During this period, Turkish-American commercial relations developed gradually and expanded until 1929. However, trade between the two countries plateaued after 1927, due to the decline in the production of tobacco, which was the leading commercial commodity in bilateral trade. 1929 was the last year that Turkish-American commercial relations followed a regular course. The Great Depression of 1929 and the Turkish government’s increase in customs tariffs had a devastating effect on bilateral trade, decreasing Turkish imports from the United States from approximately $6,000,000 to $4,000,000 (Tezel, 2015, p. 192). This decline was even more remarkable in Turkish statistics, which recorded a fall from about $8,000,000 to $2,000,000 (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2012, pp. 497-505).

Main Products of Trade

Preferred for its distinct flavor, Turkish tobacco was commonly used as a blend with American varieties. To assure the collection of the desired type of tobacco, leading American companies conducted direct harvest, transfer, purchase, and export operations through their resident agents in Macedonia, Western Anatolia and Samsun. Previous successive failures to facilitate the expansion of American business presence in the Ottoman Empire may have dampened US government resolve to orchestrate further such bids, but a notable exception was its willingness to support American initiatives in the Ottoman tobacco
sector (From Huntington Wilson to MacMurray, 1913; From Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 1913; From Ravndal to the Secretary of State, 1913). With this support in mind, the American administration attempted to organize a business syndicate of the American tobacco companies to win a contract for the Tobacco Regie. The Tobacco Regie was the only authorized company to trade tobacco in the Ottoman Empire and was operated by the French at the time. However, the American officials failed to unite American companies, resulting in the extension of the French contract with the Ottoman administration in 1913 (From Ravndal to the Secretary of State, 1913).

Official figures show that the US was a key consumer of Ottoman tobacco, but it may have been more than what is normally recognized. Austria-Hungary was the Ottoman Empire’s most important tobacco customer before WWI whereas the US ranked second during these years. However, in the post-war period, Italy replaced Austria-Hungary as the primary customer, importing nearly half of the Empire’s tobacco products, and the US came in second again with a share of 30% (Keyder, 1981). This remarkable shift in consumption patterns was contingent on the status of Trieste, ceded by Austria to Italy after the war. Trieste was the principal transshipment port for Ottoman agricultural products, and therefore, the tobacco which was re-exported here to the United States should also be considered when evaluating the importance of the US in the Turkish tobacco trade. A significant amount of tobacco, with a value fluctuating between $2,000,000 and $7,000,000, was also exported to the United States from Trieste and a substantial portion of this export was considered to be of Turkish origin (Goodman, 1988, pp. 41, 164).

Adequate provision of food to Istanbul was ever a concern and priority for the Ottoman government. In order to secure the flow of foods to the capital in the early years of the 19th century, the government directly intervened in the food supply process by establishing a supply chain and founding the Ministry of Grain Zahire Nezareti (Güran, 1986). Following the Baltalimanı Treaty (1838) and the subsequent commercial treaties of the 1840s, foreign shipments of food commodities to the Empire increased due to their high profitability. Even grains and flour became one of the Empire’s primary imports despite the existence of abundant native supply throughout its territories. This seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon of large-scale grain importation was due largely to the insufficiency of the Ottoman transportation system. Lacking a developed railway, Ottoman transportation was heavily dependent on draft animals and the inefficiency of this method imposed a higher cost on commodities even if they originated inside the Empire itself. Furthermore, commercial treaties prohibited the Ottoman government from levying taxes on such imports, thereby inhibiting protection of the Empire’s local production. Together, underdeveloped transportation and inability to impose tariffs, rendered the importation of grain to Istanbul from foreign countries less costly than shipping it from other cities in Anatolia (Pamuk, 2017, p. 21; Güran, 2019, p. 81). Indicative of this dependence on foreign grain production, records show that flour and wheat would comprise 5% and 2% of Ottoman imports respectively (Pamuk, 1995, p. 52). Until WWI, Russia, Bulgaria, and Romania were the primary sources of wheat and flour for Istanbul after the local Anatolian supply (Flour at Constantinople, 1921). However, new circumstances emerged with the entrance of the Ottomans into WWI. Foreign trade was brought to a halt by the Allied blockade of Ottoman sea routes, whereas increased military consumption and declining local production promoted the demand for foreign flour and wheat (Pamuk, 2018, p. 165).

Under these conditions of grain scarcity that gripped the Empire, American flour made its entrance into the Ottoman market at the outset of the 20th century. Due to its price advantage, made possible by the country’s developed agricultural infrastructure, extensive network of railways and vast marine transportation capacity, American flour became a serious competitor to local supply (Demetrus, 1921). However, the export of flour and wheat to the Ottoman Empire was not substantial until the end of WWI when the price of wheat, flour and bread increased significantly and the normalization of the supply and the prices could only be achieved after the Armistice of Mudros with the reintroduction of foreign shipments (Eldem, 1994, p. 50). In these years, the Ottomans relied on the much more substantial American wheat supply, having recourse to the US government to secure its importation. Upon the approval of the government, the shipments of flour from the US rapidly increased and reached about 100,000 tons in 1921, thereby decreasing the flour prices in Istanbul from 37 piasters per oke in 1920 to 14 piasters per oke in
1921. This large volume of importation was rapidly curtailed with the new Turkish administration’s customs tax increase on flour; however, at this time, American wheat had already begun to dominate the Istanbul market due to its price advantage over the native supply. For this reason, wheat imports climbed from 5,000 tons to 20,000 tons between 1921 and 1925, and it was not until the arrival of Balkan and Anatolian supply that US wheat imports plummeted to several tons (Department of Commerce, 1922; Eldem, 1994, pp. 50-51).

Fruits and nuts, especially figs and raisins, were another significant Ottoman and later Turkish agricultural export to the US. Until 1917 about 13% of the Empire’s total exports were comprised of fruits and nuts. With regard to Ottoman-American trade in particular, more than 10% of the Empire’s exports to the US included figs, raisins, almonds, filberts, pistachios and dates until the end of WWI (Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1908-1930). Since the early days of American independence, these products were primarily produced in Western Anatolia, and subsequently transported to Izmir for exportation. However, this trade was often thwarted by sanitary problems prevailing in the warehouses. During the Ottoman era, the British and American consular officials intervened in the packing and preparation procedures and sometimes refused the certification requests necessary for the exportation of these products (Smyrna Trade Conditions, 1913). Even until 1930, unhygienic conditions in the warehouse packing process continued, prompting calls for merchants to employ mechanical equipment to maintain a more sanitary environment (The Smyrna Fig and Raisin Industry, 1928).

American Commercial Presence in Anatolia until 1930

American-Ottoman and later American-Turkish trade volume grew significantly in the early period of the 20th century, with the majority of this commerce directed towards the United States. Ottoman/Turkish products occupied a relatively minor place in the entirety of US foreign commerce, whereas American business, though limited to just a few sectors, played an appreciable role in the Ottoman and Turkish economy. Relying on information presented in the Levant Trade Review, this chapter will discuss several key American companies that established businesses in Anatolia.

American Tobacco Company and MacAndrews & Forbes

The US was the primary consumer of the Turkish tobacco yield and tobacco products constituted the largest share in bilateral trade. Thus, American companies involved in tobacco commerce in Turkey established their own facilities and networks to control and supervise the harvest and transportation of the tobacco leaves. The American Tobacco Company was the largest American buyer of Turkish tobacco with a sales volume of $10,000,000 and about 4 thousand employees in Kavala, Izmir, Samsun and Izmit (DeNovo, 1968, p. 39). MacAndrews & Forbes was the pioneer of licorice paste in the United States and dominated half of the market in the country (US Senate, 1912, p. 5094). The American Tobacco Company acquired MacAndrews and Forbes in 1902 due to the importance of the licorice root in cigarette production. Importing more than a million dollars’ worth of licorice root to the US from the Ottoman Empire, the company’s total investment was around $400,000 in 1938 (Uygun, 2015, p. 343; DeNovo, 1968, p. 265).

Gary Tobacco Company Inc.

Gary Tobacco had its Near East headquarters in Istanbul and maintained branches in Samsun, Izmir, Kavala, Drama, Serres, Rodolivos, Zanthi and Gumulcine through which the company purchased tobacco for Liggett & Myers Tobacco of New York. It employed its own resident buyers and tobacco experts to assure the purchase of the desired types of leaves and all processes were overseen by its American supervisors (The Gary Tobacco Company and the Production of Turkish Tobacco, 1911).

Abbott’s Emery Mines Ltd.

The American Emery Trust established a partnership with English companies and jointly founded Abbott’s Emery Mines Ltd. in southwest Anatolia, where large deposits of emery rock had been detected. The company acquired the rights to vast emery reserves in Anatolia and became the leading supplier of emery to the US and Britain (Kurmuş, 2007, pp. 218-220). The manager of the company, E. A. Magnifico, was formerly the American Vice Consul (Ballard, 1919).
Singer Sewing Machines

With its network and marketing methods, Singer Sewing Machines was described in a 1915 issue of Levant Trade Review as a model for American companies interested in doing business in the Near East (Our Sixth Annual Meeting, 1915). Establishing its first direct branch in Istanbul in 1881, the company produced a turnover of $1,000,000 by means of its 200 stores and numerous sales agents scattered throughout the Empire in 1918 (Geyikdağı, 2011; Köse, 2016).

Western Electronic Company of Chicago

After the restoration of the constitution in 1908, the Empire’s communication infrastructure became a primary focus of the new regime and the Istanbul telephone line system was among the first projects to be contracted (DeNovo, 1968, p. 40; Telephones at the Capital, 1911). The Western Electronic Company of Chicago acquired the contract in cooperation with French and British partners and the project was completed by 1912 (Telephone System for Constantinople, 1912).

American-Turkish Investment Corporation of Delaware

Counted among the largest American initiatives in Turkey, the American-Turkish Investment Corporation of Delaware obtained the rights in 1930 to monopolize match production in the country for 25 years in return for $10,000,000 credit and a TL1,800,000 (about $850,000) annual payment (New American Trade and Industrial Activities in the Near East, 1930). The company was ultimately unable to repay the entirety of its debts and went bankrupt, resulting in the Turkish government’s cancellation of the contract in 1943 (Demirbilek, 2012).

Fox Brothers International Corporation

A construction contracting company, Fox Brothers initially negotiated for the Samsun and Mersin port projects, which included the construction of an approximately 1200 km railway and two ports at a cost of $60,000,000 (American Enterprises in Turkey, 1928; Europe to Build "Lincoln Highway", 1928). However, the final contract granted the company projects that were much smaller in scope, such as the erection of Kayseri Train Station and other facilities, as well as the construction of an 80 km railway from Kayseri. All such projects were completed by 1932 (As, 2006).

Remington

One of the world’s leading type-writer manufacturers, Remington had sales offices in Istanbul and Mersin. The new Republic’s educational revolution in 1928 increased demand for the company’s products and resulted in the sale of 3,000 typewriters to the Turkish government (Turkey, 1929; Levant Trade Review, 1931).

American Foreign Trade Corporation

Entering the Turkish market with its first Istanbul office in 1919, the American Foreign Trade Corporation dealt with the trade of agricultural implements, textiles, staple foods as well as marketing for Ford, Fordson, Buick, Oldsmobile, GMC and Cadillac. Furthermore, the company ran two auto showrooms, two mechanic shops and a driver school (American Foreign Trade Corporation, 1923).

Edgar B. Howard Co.

Initially exporting wool, skins, mohair, and nuts to the US and importing machinery, foods and textile to Turkey, the firm opened its branch in Istanbul in 1922 and later took over the American Garage, which was an American car and tractor dealership (American Firms in Turkey, 1924; Edgar B. Howard, 1923).

Guaranty Trust Company

Upon opening its Istanbul office in September of 1920, the Guaranty Trust Company of New York became the first American banking institution to establish a branch in Turkey. Despite its close ties with the American business community in the region, the company did not reach the desired business volume due to the surrounding chaos of regional wars and economic crises. The company was eventually obliged to sell
its branch to the Ionian Bank in September 1922 (The Guaranty Trust Company of New York Opens a Branch at Constantinople, 1920; Closing of Constantinople Offices of the guaranty Trust Company of New York, 1922).

**American Express Company**

In March 1922, the bank opened its branch in Istanbul where its Near East headquarters were also located (American Express Co. Opens a General Agency in Constantinople, 1921).

**Fidelity-Phoenix Insurance Company of New York**

After launching its services in Turkey in June 1924, the company reached the highest share in the fire insurance business and maintained its operations until it was discontinued in 1928 (Turkey, 1928).

**General Motors**

General Motors founded its branch in Istanbul in 1920 and established dealerships in other Turkish cities as well (American Automotive Industry, 1920; Chevrolet Contest Sales, 1928).

**Ford Motor Company**

The Ford Motor Company installed an assembly plant in Istanbul in 1929 to supply cars to the Near East market (Odman, 2011). Furthermore, Ford transferred its main office from Egypt to Istanbul and the company supplied almost all Ford vehicles sold to the Near East in 1930 (Turkey, 1929, p. 256).

**Standard Oil Company of New York (SOCONY)**

Standard Oil (Standard Oil Company of New York after 1911) had supplied oil to the region through İzmir since the 1880s, but the formation of a local network and organization in the Ottoman Empire took place in 1909 when the company opened its Near East headquarters in Istanbul (Standard Oil Company of New York, 1914; Geyikdağ, 2011, p. 125). In 1910, the company constructed its own facilities for storage and distribution in İzmir, and subsequently opened additional branches in the cities of Ankara, Mersin and in other countries in the Near East (Levant Trade Review, 1931, p. 206). The Standard Oil Company’s subsidiary, Vacuum Oil, also had a wide distribution network throughout the region with its offices in Mersin, Iskenderun and Istanbul (A Servant to the Peoples of the Globe, 1921). In the 1930s, the volume of investment by these two partner companies totaled approximately $2,500,000, making SOCONY one of the leading American capital owners in the region (DeNovo, 1968, p. 265).

**Conclusion**

The United States was always a prominent buyer of Ottoman and Turkish exports and at times played a crucial role in its supply of products such as flour and wheat. The US, however, did not manage to gain a foothold in the Ottoman market and most of its attempts at exportation and investment fell through or yielded negligible results. Uncovering the context and events that led to this lack of success on the part of the Americans became the purpose of this project. It is true that several prominent American companies were active in the region and in 1930 the volume of their investments amounted to approximately $14,000,000. However, these companies still contributed just a small proportion of the country’s total foreign investments.

The first major commercial link between the Ottoman Empire and the United States took place in the second half of the 19th century with the Empire’s importation of rifles, cartridges and machinery from the US. The Ottoman demand for military equipment stemmed from the administration’s desire to modernize its army, alongside its numerous other modernization programs of the era. During the 1870’s and 1880’s, 600,000 rifles were purchased from the American government and this transaction forged a relationship between the US president Ulysses S. Grant and the Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz. In fact, President Grant would pay a visit to the Sultan and became the first American president to come to Istanbul, albeit after the end of his term. Furthermore, Grant’s son Fredrick and Civil War Hero William T. Sherman also visited Istanbul in 1872 (Gencer, Örenç & Ünver, 2008, pp. 70-71; Sönmez, 2013). However, despite these promising, early connections between the two states, the Ottoman Empire would eventually turn to Germany in order to ward off the British and Russian threat to its territorial integrity and this shift in foreign
policy ultimately resulted in the transfer of the arms contract to German companies. Germany was equally eager to establish ties with the Ottomans as it sought to expand its economic interests in the Middle East through concessions and governmental contracts (Ortaylı, 1981, pp. 22-38). For the Germans, the Ottoman Empire represented a promising market with its under-developed economy, rich source of minerals and raw material, and strategic geographic advantage (Orhan, 2018, p. 652).

In the 20th century, the Dollar Diplomacy of the Taft Administration from 1909-1913 encouraged US business initiatives in the Empire. One notable result of this policy was the Chester Project, which the US government and embassy continuously advocated for through their negotiations with the Ottomans. In another example, the US government supported American shipbuilding companies in their pursuit of Ottoman naval tenders. Both projects were ultimately thwarted by previously established political privileges of European powers that had already been active in the Empire. The former was primarily impeded by opposition from the Germans, who previously held a concession in the same area of Ottoman Iraq, while the latter failed due to the British Empire’s dominant position in the Empire’s naval reformation.

The superiority of European influence in the Empire during the early 20th century is also exemplified in the Standard Oil Company of New York’s unsuccessful attempt to complete a plant and depot implementation project, which it launched in Salonica in 1908. Steau Romana, which was controlled by the German Deutsche Bank, was Standard Oil’s main rival in the region and also planned to erect its facilities in the city. Despite the Abdulhamid Administration’s early permission to Standard Oil, the 1908 revolution and the inauguration of the new regime delayed the company’s plans. Steau Romana, however, successfully acquired the necessary permission through its ties with the local authorities (Geyikdağı, 2011, pp. 125-158).

Beyond these occasional clashes over particular coveted projects or investment opportunities, the Great Powers of Europe, particularly Great Britain, held broader concerns regarding America’s rapid industrial growth and foreign trade expansion. The era’s imperialism, which divided and colonized the world to exploit its resources, limited potential markets and set aspiring industrialist economies in competition with each other. Unsurprisingly, Great Britain, whose imperial domain in this era was the most expansive, was among the countries opposed to the Chester Project.

When global political conditions are considered, the absence of strong American investment in the Ottoman Empire can be primarily attributed to the aggressive competition of European powers which were unwilling to share the Ottoman market. Given the rather hostile environment, American companies that managed to establish successful investments in the Ottoman Empire generally made use of partnerships with European companies in order to obtain tenders or concessions. For instance, the Western Electric Company of Chicago partnered with French and British companies and the American Emery Trust merged with British companies to establish Abbott’s Emery Mines Ltd. in Western Anatolia. Furthermore, SOCONY, which was accused by the Empire’s British and German representatives of covertly attempting to reach the Mosul Oil Reserves through the Chester Project, eventually achieved its aim by partnering with the Turkish Petroleum Company alongside the French and the British (Issawi, 1988, p. 371). Ultimately, these failures of US enterprise in the region as well as their relatively limited scope in the whole of the Ottoman market resulted in the US government’s decision to discourage American investment in the Empire and to direct their focus to the Far East.

In conclusion, commercial concerns were the basis of Ottoman-American ties since first contact at the end of the 18th century and continued to define interactions between the two states into the 20th century as well. The relationship held particular importance on the side of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, which managed to maintain a trade surplus due to the large volume of tobacco, fruits, nuts, hides and carpets exported to the US. Despite fluctuations in trade volume, the United States was generally ranked as the second largest consumer of Ottoman/Turkish exports during this era and its avid purchase of agricultural goods can be said to have contributed to the development of Western Anatolia and Samsun, which produced the majority of the region’s tobacco, fruits and nuts. While American investment in Anatolia was largely unsuccessful due to the era’s political conflicts and imperial competition, the US nonetheless played a central role in the late-Ottoman and early-Turkish economy and agricultural development.
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Appendices

| Appendix 1 Table 1: Turkish Foreign Trade from 1900-1930 |
|-----------|----------|----------|------------|
|            | Exports  | Imports  | Balance    |
| 1900       | $65,087,336 | $104,104,803 | ($39,017,467) |
| 1901       | $67,218,341 | $107,283,843 | ($40,065,502) |
| 1902       | $67,956,332 | $100,550,218 | ($32,593,886) |
| 1903       | $76,593,886 | $106,532,751 | ($29,938,865) |
| 1904       | $74,257,642 | $121,847,162 | ($47,589,520) |
| 1905       | $85,903,930 | $136,969,432 | ($51,065,502) |
| 1906       | $81,104,803 | $146,458,515 | ($65,353,712) |
| 1907       | $76,397,380 | $102,921,397 | ($26,524,017) |
| 1908       | $80,519,651 | $137,257,642 | ($56,737,991) |
| 1909       | $80,493,450 | $151,689,956 | ($71,196,506) |
| 1909-1910  | $93,318,777 | $151,703,057 | ($58,384,280) |
| 1910-1911  | $106,462,882 | $185,851,528 | ($79,388,646) |
| 1911-1912  | $122,707,424 | $196,768,559 | ($74,061,135) |
| 1912-1913  | $116,244,541 | $190,174,672 | ($73,930,131) |
| 1913-1914  | $108,377,193 | $183,508,772 | ($75,131,579) |
| 1914-1915  | $65,913,043 | $96,130,435 | ($30,217,392) |
| 1915-1916  | $18,846,154 | $16,538,462 | $2,307,692 |
| 1916-1917  | $31,875,000 | $38,437,500 | ($6,562,500) |
### Table 2: Turkish-American Trade, 1900-1930 (in USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Turkish Imports*</th>
<th>Turkish Exports*</th>
<th>Turkish Balance of Trade</th>
<th>Total Trade</th>
<th>Total Trade Price Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>$567,012</td>
<td>$7,754,237</td>
<td>$7,187,225</td>
<td>$8,321,249</td>
<td>$14,832,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>$587,120</td>
<td>$7,284,636</td>
<td>$6,697,516</td>
<td>$7,871,756</td>
<td>$14,234,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>$774,552</td>
<td>$8,895,636</td>
<td>$8,121,084</td>
<td>$9,670,188</td>
<td>$16,418,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>$773,107</td>
<td>$10,570,006</td>
<td>$9,796,899</td>
<td>$11,343,113</td>
<td>$19,032,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>$1,110,336</td>
<td>$9,587,126</td>
<td>$8,476,790</td>
<td>$10,697,462</td>
<td>$17,918,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>$1,520,027</td>
<td>$12,994,267</td>
<td>$11,474,240</td>
<td>$14,514,294</td>
<td>$23,485,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>$1,742,728</td>
<td>$14,606,188</td>
<td>$12,863,460</td>
<td>$16,348,916</td>
<td>$25,075,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>$1,969,860</td>
<td>$10,759,570</td>
<td>$8,789,710</td>
<td>$12,729,430</td>
<td>$20,237,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>$2,511,482</td>
<td>$12,429,128</td>
<td>$9,917,646</td>
<td>$14,940,610</td>
<td>$22,101,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>$2,340,160</td>
<td>$16,353,901</td>
<td>$14,013,741</td>
<td>$18,694,061</td>
<td>$26,554,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>$3,940,053</td>
<td>$17,690,812</td>
<td>$13,750,759</td>
<td>$21,630,865</td>
<td>$33,329,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>$3,798,168</td>
<td>$19,208,926</td>
<td>$15,410,758</td>
<td>$23,007,094</td>
<td>$33,295,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>$3,313,821</td>
<td>$22,159,285</td>
<td>$18,845,464</td>
<td>$25,473,106</td>
<td>$36,494,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>$3,328,519</td>
<td>$20,843,077</td>
<td>$17,514,558</td>
<td>$24,171,596</td>
<td>$35,494,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>$994,120</td>
<td>$12,228,707</td>
<td>$11,234,587</td>
<td>$13,222,827</td>
<td>$19,025,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>$42,169</td>
<td>$864,485</td>
<td>$822,316</td>
<td>$906,654</td>
<td>$1,060,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>$167,515</td>
<td>$335,590</td>
<td>$168,075</td>
<td>$503,105</td>
<td>$1,048,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>$305,557</td>
<td>$222,039</td>
<td>$-83,518</td>
<td>$527,596</td>
<td>$401,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>$25,231,722</td>
<td>$37,003,002</td>
<td>$11,771,280</td>
<td>$62,234,724</td>
<td>$44,902,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>$42,247,798</td>
<td>$39,766,936</td>
<td>$-2,480,862</td>
<td>$82,014,734</td>
<td>$53,118,351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: Figures in parentheses indicate Turkish trade deficit. **: Only includes the foreign trade of İstanbul.

Source: Turkish Foreign Trade Statistics Yearbook (2013), Vedat Eldem (1934)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>$23,947,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>$15,980,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>$3,464,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>$3,314,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>$3,351,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>$2,917,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>$3,941,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>$4,110,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>$5,741,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>$4,385,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Leland Gordon (1932)

App. 3: Turkish Ottoman Exports to the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Oils and fats</td>
<td>$751,150</td>
<td>$468,205</td>
<td>$718,025</td>
<td>$1,591,225</td>
<td>$528,125</td>
<td>$714,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Cotton manufactures of</td>
<td>$514,395</td>
<td>$242,197</td>
<td>$121,957</td>
<td>$321,257</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Wool and manufactures of</td>
<td>$2,035,626</td>
<td>$1,929,931</td>
<td>$1,241,241</td>
<td>$1,537,986</td>
<td>$515,286</td>
<td>$334,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Iron and steel manufactures of</td>
<td>$246,040</td>
<td>$725,150</td>
<td>$239,675</td>
<td>$216,490</td>
<td>$178,505</td>
<td>$170,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Tobacco manufactures of</td>
<td>$19,000</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$21,000</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Tea, coffee, and manufactures of</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td>$14,000</td>
<td>$11,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Sugar manufactures of</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Rice and manufactures of</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Other manufactures of</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

App. 4: Turkish Ottoman Imports from the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Agricultural Implements</td>
<td>$105,000</td>
<td>$41,000</td>
<td>$65,000</td>
<td>$62,000</td>
<td>$55,000</td>
<td>$123,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Breadstuffs</td>
<td>$71,000</td>
<td>$22,000</td>
<td>$21,000</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
<td>$14,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Automobiles, tractors, trucks, buses and parts</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,200</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Cotton manufactures</td>
<td>$91,000</td>
<td>$158,000</td>
<td>$101,000</td>
<td>$78,000</td>
<td>$67,000</td>
<td>$67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Iron and steel manufactures</td>
<td>$2,050,000</td>
<td>$725,000</td>
<td>$239,675</td>
<td>$216,475</td>
<td>$178,505</td>
<td>$170,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Tobacco manufactures</td>
<td>$19,000</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$21,000</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Tea, coffee, and manufactures</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td>$14,000</td>
<td>$11,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sugar manufactures</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Rice and manufactures</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Other manufactures</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Exports of Merchandise: $567,012,000