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## Breakdown of the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization

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### Abstract

The most advanced societies have no newly-needed democratic formations, as legally unsecured intellectual freedom may be usurped by powerful institutions having a formal respect for the old democratic principles. Generally, this means that we are witnessing not just personality changes, but tectonic shifts in the legal and political strata that existed and developed within the period of Modernity. The purpose of this research is to identify the features of current crisis in the Anglo-Saxon globalization. This goal can be achieved on the back of classical philosophy and large-scale historical material applied simultaneously. This approach demonstrates that globalization processes are still guided by the legacy of early English history and the ideas that originated during the Age of Enlightenment. Anglo-Saxon Model discredits itself and, consequently, becomes non-legitimate when it comes to its supreme right to interpret the idea of democracy. An important aspect of this research is how the religious trends of the 17<sup>th</sup> century were interwoven with political, legal and cultural consequences.

**Keywords:** The Enlightenment, History of economic thought, Cultural crisis, Pragmatic and existential spheres of personality, Democracy.

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## **Introduction**

Enlightenment philosophers, most significantly Kant, placed the concept of Sense above Reason, referring to it as to a higher capability of human mind. Sense deals with earthly matters, while Reason – with the essence of what is heavenly, absolute and endless. In other words, the first one is concerned with experience, pragmatism and practicality. Society becomes a civilization (Kant, 1995) through a deliberation of this kind.

Reason brings another dimension in a person to light that is not centered on money, profit and adaptation lifestyle. Reason makes the living being become a supreme creation of the nature through intellectual development. Human mind allows shaping the sphere of goals and meanings of existence. However, this concept is not the one that grounds the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization.

In 1981, John MacLean was first to come up with the notion of “globalization”; he suggested explaining and attaining insight into the history social globalization (MacLean, 2000). According to Russian scholars (Globalization, 2003), globalization comes with the interaction of national economies, open information exchange, free goods/capital flow, interethnic social movements, international space station programs, innovations and international education systems. However, one should search for the roots of globalization ideology in British history.

## **Literature Review**

The world’s literary legacy provides plenty of material from three different kinds of sources. Firstly, these are sources defining the ideas that originated during the Age of Enlightenment, as well as their touch with cultural and political consequences of globalization (Adorno, 1950; Fromm, 1940; Marcuse, 1964). This purely philosophical focus on the issue is a feature typical for such sources that predetermined the range of publications associated with the ethical reflection of globalization consequences. It seems that the Frankfurt School’s legacy plays a pivotal role in the case.

Secondly, these are sources containing data on cultural, religious and socio-political thoughts that were common in England back in 17<sup>th</sup> - 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. There is a wide range of such (Beer, 1940; Bosanquet, 1958; Dicey, 2017; Lerner, 1961; Morley, 1901; Seeley, 1914) indicating a clear line of historical development that appears to be guided by the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization. They reveal the way the main features of the model developed.

Thirdly, these are sources touching upon modern enough aspects of the raised problem (Ferro, 2017; Jennings, 2006; Henrekson & Jakobsson, 2003). They are tricky, as their scope did not include the issues that we have raised, although they were addressed indirectly.

## **Methodological Framework**

The research topic was chosen on the background of a fundamental viewpoint affirming that dynamics of culture itself are associated with political and economic changes. The research was carried out through the lens of the Philosophy of Culture (Collingwood, 1964). At first, we applied a comparative approach and critical analysis. These methodological principles allowed us to get to the roots of the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization.

Comparative analysis of historical data revealed the universals and particulars in history of globalization (Bird, 1841; Gardiner, 1895; Strachey, 1948; Trevelyan, 1937). In turn, critical analysis of principles and procedures, applied to any phenomenon, was carried out under assumption that this application is universal. The research takes into consideration the Kantian assertion of the difference between two

concepts (Reason and Sense) that lead us to a fundamental difference between such phenomena as *Culture* and *Civilization* (Marcuse, 1964). Thus, we were able to make a distinction between intellectual and political freedom (Fromm, 1940) with regard to fundamental provisions of Kant's Critical Philosophy and the Frankfurt School Critical Theory (Adorno, 1950).

## Results

Britain has always been in a specific relationship with Europe. It was revealing its insular character academically, religiously, philosophically, and morally throughout to Modernity. Britain passed through traditionalism, liberalism and evolutionism. The Industrial Revolution was the only significant rouse that affected the keystones of society since the Glorious Revolution. Ireland has been suppressed long before the English Revolution rippled across the Europe. Even Chartism that meant to be a powerful movement failed in being the most impressive form of social protest (Bosanquet, 1958).

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, British crisis of Reason was not as evident as in the continent. Brits addressed only the frame of the concept, dedicating only few papers to the matter. There is still a question in the air of what was the cause of such difference in reflection practices between Britain and the Continental Europe of that time notable for the works of Nietzsche, Spengler and Simmel. In order to find the answer, we should go behind the common facts.

Firstly, British legal and political system originated long before other similar systems did – it took its shape by the 12<sup>th</sup> century, far earlier than it happened in the continent.

The second example is as much interesting – its bipartisan system was also an early case that kept in line up to 20<sup>th</sup> century. Whigs and Tories (the driving forces of the Glorious Revolution of 1688) remained in balance for years, helping to avoid the revolutionary ways of solving problems.

Thirdly, the Reformation impact on the national social system was also out of line with the British history. In the years since Henry VIII, Brits shaped a special world-outlook that demonstrated their attitude to the Continent. Once Britain had broken free of Rome's guardianship, it took the chance to enhance its ideological separation from Europe. The spread of Calvinism did affect the revolutionary events of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. As the first revolution broke out and the Independent Republic was proclaimed, the Calvinist spirit inspired the intellectual core of social changes. Sir Trevelyan noticed that seventeenth-century opposition side formed on the back of a war of ideas and principles rather than on the back of hungry revolt (Trevelyan, 1937). The ideas expressed by the social group that headed the revolution coincided, to a great extent, with expectations of other social strata. Remarkably, Giles Lytton Strachey noticed that the English Reformation was rather social than a religious event (Strachey, 1948). Puritanism that originally was a driving force of changes was sewn into the fabric of British history, revealing the power that Britain had in the area of politics, literature, social and private life.

The Counter-Reformation did not strike in Britain as it did in Europe. There was a lasting struggle between groups and parties linked with certain religious sects and tendencies, as well as with the Catholicism. However, Calvinism managed to keep its secular position, preserving and strengthening its influence through politics. Although it is true that the Puritans were persecuted and forced to leave the isles, the Puritan ideology became ingrained and survived even under unfavorable conditions (Dicey, 2017).

Britain has so far preserved (in the religious sense) the transformations that were brought about by the Tudors. Puritanism is still standing by the Parliament. The public thought recognized their relation long ago. Puritans rejected any supremacy in the Church, which was arranged as a federative republican system. The national Synod was kind of a church parliament (Bird, 1841; Gardiner, 1895). This came with tremendous consequences for the nation. Although defenders of the ancient rights of the Parliament came together

with the Puritans sympathetic with Scottish Presbyterianism in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the event predetermined the line of Britain's political development for ages to come. In particular, Britain was viewed as a Puritan country up to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The long standing economic supremacy, Britain's governmental power, the lasting experience of liberal development, early-maturing political institutions of an industrial society, national capability to find a social compromise in order to avoid huge destructive upheavals during tense historical moments; specific religious experience – all these and many more other factors have strengthened the primal side of British mentality, namely – the sense of superiority and exceptionality.

As a matter of fact, the British globalization model has already taken its shape at this stage. Its interior features, however, are shown in detail by the British School of Philosophy. It is worth remembering: while Enlightenment thinkers from the continent were making a distinction between Reason and Sense, the British intellectual tradition concentrated upon the latter concept, as evidenced from the unparalleled empirical bias of the British thought.

Paradoxically, English absolute idealism also comprised empirical and pragmatic elements. Hegel reshaped the Enlightenment idea of Reason as a transforming force into a concept of the Absolute Idea of Self-Development. Later, K. Marx *brought* another feature into the light – the Enlightenment Justice and Social Equality. Neo-Hegelianism, however, lays emphasis on other aspects.

British representative of Neo-Hegelianism – Francis Herbert Bradley – stood up for “self-realization through self-sacrifice” as the basic principle, not in a sense of service to the people, but in a sense of submission to the *absolute* (Bradley, 1893). At this point, the State grows out such a state of personality.

The metaphysical requirement for stability of the social system in Green's Neo-Hegelianism is very similar to the philosophical version of the Whigs' political program. Public stability on the back of social stability is the invariable point of the British liberal program, which would repeatedly arise in books considering Hegel's doctrine.

It is remarkable how Edward Caird treats the Hegelian concept of “the State”. For Caird, the State should be put in one line with a family, which members are naturally part of one race speaking a common language. Thus, he pushed aside Hegel's metaphysical construction of the State and appealed directly to Hobbs.

Social evolutionism mixed with pragmatism was brought to a head by Bernard Bosanquet. Moreover, Bertrand Russell noted that although the influence of German idealism in Britain was unlikely to spread beyond the universities, it was enthroned inside them. Within their verge, Neo-Hegelianism laid *academic* grounds for the idea of evolutional unification of the world under the British Empire designation. The above-mentioned episode became the first crucial element of the current model of globalization, namely: the inalienable right to lay down the rules belongs to no one, but the Anglo-Saxons.

The fact is that the leading concepts in 19<sup>th</sup> century Britain were utilitarianism, pragmatism and *pure* social evolutionism *unstained* by metaphysics (Bentham, 2000; Mill, 2001). The British philosophy of pragmatism was as significant as the European interpretation of cultural crisis at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup>–20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Moreover, one should bear in mind that pragmatism is a purely Anglo-American phenomenon. British propensity for compromises and stepwise reforms will always be guided by the principle of utility.

This idea, expressed in details by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spenser, was promoted by British pragmatism for a purpose.

British Empiricism rooted the Pragmatism into the core of Reformation (Hobhouse, 1925; Spencer, 1978). Puritans of the Independent Republic seem to share one motto with John Stuart Mill: of all the wastes, emotional ones are the worthless, as they promote fruitful activity in no way (Mill, 2001). Later, William

James compares the roles of Pragmatism and Reformation, explaining the historical background of Anglo-American Pragmatism. The direct relation between Protestantism and Pragmatism is evident from the following reasoning. Vocational call of a Man starting the Reformation and the pragmatism of the latter are capped by the philosophical rule.

The English Reformation and the Puritan Revolution of the 17<sup>th</sup> century entailed some specific types of everyday life practices. Religious Puritanism turned into a *New Puritanism* of Bourgeois Morality, while the Pragmatism itself was driven by everyday moral duties. In an ordinary consciousness, it lost its academic isolation almost at once. As a matter of fact, Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller intended to promote this process when he linked pragmatism with *humanism* (Schiller, 1978).

The Philosophy of Pragmatism reflects this phenomenon by explicating or implicating that the Puritan morality standards turned into pragmatic moral categories. The primacy of duty, activity, thrift, and emotional reserve configured the basis of national mentality. Even in political sphere, Puritanism hardly lost its grounds. As Whigs were puritan, active landlords, members of the new-born bourgeoisie and citizens could practice Anglicanism, being Whig adherents at the same time. This shift from a religious tenet to a secular regulation will remove the discrepancy between the requirements, imposed by the official religious doctrine, and the actual lifestyle.

There was another significant change. The Radicalism of the Puritan Revolution took another path as Whigs turned liberal. Thus, any thing that was not put into action immediately could be brought about over the centuries. In the British case, “evolution” and “development” concepts were replaced by the concepts of “evolution” and “averaging”. Max Beer’s description is as following: in a destructive climate of compromises, the subtlety of theoretical thought, a person’s fundamental position and a manner of thinking through an idea to its logical end were far from being welcomed, they were avoided (Beer, 1940). A similar viewpoint was articulated by John Morley in *On Compromise* (Morley, 1901): the latter develops to originate a solid, properly functioning social model, where it is permitted to be rich, where the poor are provided with the minimum financial state support and social security; where order is maintained by an effective police system, where nobody cares whether one is a believer or an atheist, and where the endless development of the economy and wealth has been enunciated. This industrial and consumer society has been averaged in a manner so that it could be focused on continuous economic development.

Thus, the second element of the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization is rooted in a clear choice: the power of Sense in utility chase has been preferred to the cult of Reason and Intelligence. The empirical and pragmatic potential of Reason was proclaimed to be not only the central, but also the only national goal long before the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Hippolyte Taine writes emotionally about Puritans: *they founded Scotland; they founded the United States; at this day they are, by their descendants, founding Australia and colonizing the world*. At the same time, Sir John Seeley claimed that no issue is as important as the reciprocal influence of these branches of the English-speaking race. The future of the planet depends on how it will be resolved. In a sense, it turned out to be true.

Later, Herbert Marcuse took a similar path, putting emphasis on the close kinship of what we call the American and the British ethos. American lifestyle appeared through the lens of Puritanism as a role model. In *America as a Civilization*, Max Lerner noted that the history of how Americans conquered the entire world without arms or colonization demonstrates that America is in harmony with the spirit of the modern world (Lerner, 1961).

There is more to consider, Americans conquering *the entire world* were driven by a borrowed idea – the one that was brought by the British pilgrims. However, it is true that the modern world follows a common

purpose that is close to one that sparked some dramatic social changes both in Britain and in the USA. Was it what Sir John Seeley meant and expected to happen when he wrote about the mission of “two branches of the English-speaking race”? Aside from other actions, Britain took ideological and cultural control over the colonial area. The USA turned British idea into reality and still follows it.

Accordingly, the Anglo-Saxon project, inspired mostly by the Enlightenment ideas, is not globalized within the framework of its initial ideals and addresses a *mature*, morally autonomous subject, responsible for one’s own self-exploration. Instead of this, the Enlightenment resulted in an ideological pragmatic solution that spread all over the planet. This pragmatic attitude laid the foundation for the Anglo-Saxon Model leaving to little room for the creative power of Reason. The speeches that modern Western diplomats give on freedom have something from the colonial British model that was based on direct political rule.

As a consequence, the balance between *civilization* and *culture*, between means and goals, has been disrupted not only in Britain and the USA, but in many other countries that follow the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization. The pragmatic social consciousness lost the ability to differentiate the existential elements of being from its other elements. In the climate of uncertainty, these social systems tend to focus on what is most evident, available and effective, namely – on the *civilization*. The societies that had been pragmatically oriented for many centuries suppressed the existential sphere of life meanings in the same way as the totalitarian regimes suppressed the opposing social groups and classes.

The Europe eventually assimilated the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization after the World War II. In the meantime, the Frankfurt School proved that the human right to doubt any system – both natural and social one – as the criteria of truth when it comes to personal judgment on the existential meaning is a specific kind of freedom. However, Erich Fromm demonstrated convincingly that this release from dogma was beyond the strength that many could bear (Fromm, 1940).

Based on the provisions of existentialism, a man is the only agent responsible for his own freedom. At this point, Marshall Plan introduced a method that somehow compensated the state of uncertainty and instability. New dogmas grew from the confidence that pragmatic standards can serve as criteria of existential meanings. Simply speaking, material wealth was taken on a mass scale as the meaning of existence. Fromm defined the phenomenon as a sort of *disease* and diagnosed it as the “market-oriented personality model (Fromm, 1940).

Modern standards of democracy do not contribute to the recovery from the *Anglo-Saxon disease*. In fact, they even aggravate it. Herbert Marcuse coined the *one-dimensional* concept of a *Man*, thereby indicating that a bourgeoisie oriented towards pragmatic meanings as a super-meaning is able to variously manipulate not only the multitudes, but also political systems (Marcuse, 1964). This fact allowed avoiding the *dictatorship* of bourgeois values, which is the deep-rooted symptom of democratic consumer societies. Marcuse’s diagnosis of the Western *disease* known as the switch of meanings is still recent.

Moreover, we must take into account that the sphere of Reason has undergone a qualitative change. There was a so-called existential revolution during the 20th century, which will result in the intellectual freedom – a person will be free to decide on the meaning of being independently. Neither political, nor legal, nor even religious systems can do that for him.

Intellectual freedom seems to have been reflected in democratic constitutions proclaiming the right to mental freedom. However, neither mental world, nor the principles of mental freedom have been defined. Thus, a person’s right to define “the meaning of own life is this and that” is only indirectly indicated. Neither legal regulations, nor educational institutions contain the principle of personal existential freedom. In this climate, a person, who is unconsciously striving for freedom, but left wondering how to find it, chooses the most obvious line to follow. Standards of democracy provide a tempting image of an *ideal* society member,

but the inward man is a roadside. Such standards are universal: academic standards outline the characteristics of an enlightened individual; legal regulations – characteristics of a law-abiding individual; and the level of consumption – characteristics of a successful individual.

Thus, the individual can turn the *coordinates of success* into standards that identify intellectual freedom. However, the concept is cramped, as the very conditions of freedom were set out. The pragmatic personal sphere forms progressively as the *external rules* are adopted; a departure from these rules entails a range of social sanctions. The sphere of existential meaning, however, is not subjected to such regulation, though it can be empirically fulfilled. At the same time, political freedom turns into a false equivalent of intellectual freedom.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, western crisis of substituted meanings got stronger and followed by personality crisis. The problems that arose during this short period – symbols hiding less behind; commodity fetishism; greater demand for risk factors; suppression by power institutions; aggression in mass media, etc. – are still pressing. These problems indicate that the new experience has not been assimilated, while the clouded coordinates of existential meanings take the individual in wrong social direction. The major admission is, however, that the most advanced democratic provisions cannot regulate intellectual freedom. As a result, they fail to assess either the assimilation of such by various societies, or their level of democracy.

The West was the first to take the road to the free inward man. As the personality structure changed over the years, legal and political definition of freedom also transformed. The consistent emancipation from religious dogmatism, traditional views and political despotism was well reflected in legal regulations that have a greater share in shaping inner personal freedom these days. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, it became obvious that intellectual freedom exists *de facto* only.

In the meantime, western individual is not the only one to be affected by the personality structure transformation. Similar processes are accelerating in different countries. The historical leadership of the West is no longer a strong argument that proves its superiority in democracy building. In other words, the point here is not that western capitalism, engendered by the Protestant spirit, was once established somewhere, providing the modern world with the idea of democracy. The point is that natural and twisted process of global change in personality structure resulted in a western type of society. This fact does not make this model universally applicable – in different cultures, similar processes come with various models.

## **Discussions**

The leading concept running through this article – the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization is driven by pragmatism – was not highlighted in any other research paper, so as our assertion that such a historic choice can have a negative impact on intellectual freedom. However, the link between pragmatism and intellectual freedom has been investigated in papers that are included in our methodological basis. It should be emphasized that our conclusions on the so-called *Anglo-Saxon disease* are drawn on the back of fundamental provisions made by the Frankfurt School's representatives (Adorno, 1950; Fromm, 1940; Marcuse, 1964).

At the same time, there are different papers that indirectly touch some problems of modern globalization stemming from the background of the Anglo-Saxon Model: these are economic (Jennings, 2006; Henrekson & Jakobsson, 2003; Docquier & Hillel, 2012), cultural (Bielsa, 2012; Mélitz, 2015; Komori, 2015), and socio-political consequences. Paradoxically, the prime importance of influence that the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization has on the modern world was hardly ever considered as an independent matter. The history of the issue is even rarer matter to find. Our research is incapable to fill the entire scientific gap that has

arisen. Nevertheless, we believe that it will help to initiate a discussion attracting attention of scientific world to the problem of predominance of pragmatic principles over the existential ones.

## Conclusions

Since no kind of knowledge regulates the state of intellectual freedom, desire for comfort considered as the equivalent for the existential meaning leads to the emergence of a *soft spot*. This situation gets worse when political institutions start to pass non-legitimate judgments on ethical goals. On the other hand, their opinions on the solution of pragmatic problems are biased when the solution is dressed up in common existential meaning. In such a climate, switch of meanings can turn from a personal issue into a social one. Besides, political elites are provided with a favorable environment for their interests to lobby.

Speaking radically, the most advanced societies are non-democratic in the sense of exercising declared rights to social and political freedoms. Any political system claiming to be democratic also claims that its electivity is a legitimate ground for interpreting freedom in every sense. This practice, however, is not exactly right because the true judgments on the existential meaning do not become legitimate only because a person, who passes them, was democratically elected.

Thus, formally democratic organization breaks the fundamental principle of intellectual freedom as soon as it proclaims something specific to be the existential meaning of the system in general (no matter whether it was directly or indirectly). If this "something" is taken from the pragmatic sphere, meanings will switch on a social scale. All these circumstances together mean that such a social system discredits itself and, consequently, becomes non-legitimate when it comes to its supreme right to interpret the idea of democracy.

This is what happened with the Anglo-Saxon Model of Globalization. However, the violation of settled social rules does not mean that intellectual freedom is no longer valid. Therefore, one's reluctance to admit a mistake only makes the situation worse. Such breakdown is induced by the irrational choice that was made – we picked the concept of *civilization* to act as the existential meaning of being.

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