Review of Turkish-Israeli Relations Based on Neo-Realism

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Abstract

Basically, the two countries, Turkey and Israel, apart from their relations with Iran, are the important and influential countries in the region and the global developments associated with the Middle East, so efforts to better understand the two countries help to answer the questions about these two countries. This research, along with the historic genealogy of Turkey-Israel relations has attempted to address the roots of Turkey-Israel Westernization and its relation with the proximity of the two countries and the formation of strategic cooperation between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Our important issue in this study is to examine the relation between Turkey and Israel from a historical point of view, based on the neo-realism approach in the field of foreign policy.

Keywords: Westernization, Islam, Neo-realism, Turkey, Israel.

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1.   Introduction

The theoretical framework considered for this research is realism theory, therefore, we are going to explain the historical course of applying the theories of international relations, focusing on realism, and try to understand the relations between Turkey and Israel in terms of realism. After World War I, the domination of the idealistic liberalism theory, which pursued interdependence and peaceful cooperation between states, failed to prevent World War II, and then thinkers and theorists of international relations turned to classical realism.[2] This period coincided with the onset of the Cold War, and the domination of this theory lasted at least until the 1960s. Thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes supported the theory of classical realism, and the neoclassical realism theorists were people such as Clausewitz, Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Henry Kissinger.[3] Morgenthau (1904-1980), a German-American thinker, believed that human beings, as any human relations that make up their axis, is also the focal point of international relations and inherently seek national interests, and the nature of international conflicts is maximizing power. Realists believe that the international system is "state-centered", the principles governing the international system are "anarchy," and the distribution of power in the international system is based on "inequality."[4] The predecessors of this theory believe that the "balance of power" policy has been used to prevent the anarchic nature of the international system and to prevent war. Because international organizations cannot be relied to prevent conflict and deterrence.[5] Stefan Walt proposed a balance-of-threat theory by reforming the balance-of-power theory. From his point of view, governments are united against states that are the source of the greatest threat. In this situation, threatening state or states are not necessarily part of powerful governments. He considers the "threat", in addition to power, as not a combination of other factors, such as attacking abilities, military power, geographic proximity, and aggression intentions. He meant by threat the understanding that governments have in their relationship with the threat. In Walt's view, the threat balance theory does not replace the theory of power balance, but is intended to increase its explanatory capability. Whenever governments feel that their existence or interests are urgently threatened by other governments, they unite with each other in balance against threatening governments.[6] Considering the definition, the theoretical concept of the alliance from Walt's view that considers the alliance a form of formal or informal relation based on the security cooperation between two or more states, the alliance can be characterized as follows: 1. The formal or informal cooperative relations between the two states or more. 2. Contracts and strategic alliances. 3. Belief in collective action against the common enemy. 4. Common interests of allies for national security, at least in relation to an imaginable realistic threat[7] in supplying national interests, believe that the leaders of the states must take defend their own national interests and develop it.

While neo-realists believe that national interests are an automatic guide that determines when and on what side the leaders of the states should move, and thus, the leaders of the great powers of the world are in charge of the international order and management, and they are trying for their national strategic interests.[8]

But a review of the strategic (military-security) cooperation between Turkey and Israel has been made with the help of realism theory in general, that is, using the ideas of classical realists and new realists, the

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[2] Ali Akbar Jafari, "Neorealism theory and strategic alliance between Israel and America", Tehran, Research Journal of Law and Political Sciences, Second Year, No. 6, Autumn 2007, p. 106.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ali Akbar Jafari, Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.

precondition and causes of cooperation, contracts and strategic treaties of Turkey and Israel are examined and raised. Turkey's secular system, which had been under the military influence of the military since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, has sought to increase its military power system since it was considered as the Turkey's capability indicator, and have always considered the Turkey's military and security development plans by analyzing the geopolitical position of Turkey, which saw it surrounded by the states that have a hostile look at Turkey explicitly or implicitly. Neighborhood with the Soviet Union and the start of the Cold War pushed them further toward unity with the West, and especially the United States, to reduce the Soviet threat to themselves. Neighborhood with Syria and Iraq, which both had anti-Turkish motives and had strategic relations with the Soviet Union, further led Ankara to America and then to Israel, which received a common threat from Syria and Iraq. Israel, which had had the taste of war and struggle with its Arab neighbors, before the establishment of strategic and important relations with Turkey, further felt the necessity of creating these strategic alliances which the proximity to non-Arab states of the region - Turkey, Iran and even Ethiopia – was among its logical policies. Until the Cold War and the onset of the Middle East peace process, the strategic ties between Turkey and Israel were often secret and could not be precisely recognized. The triumph of the Islamic Revolution of Iran made Turkey to have at least an ideological challenge in its neighborhood, and Israel had a direct military-security threat since then that Turkey became strategically more important for Israel because it had effective borders with Iran. According to Stephen Walt, Turkey and Israel, by understanding the common threat posed by Iran, Syria and Iraq, maintained and secured their existence and interests through strategic contracts.

After revealing alliance of Ankara and Tel Aviv in the mid-1990s, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and even other Arab countries saw a new threat, which they should consider it in their strategic plans. According to Walt, the strategic treaties and contracts of Turkey and Israel, which identified the two countries as strategic allies, targeted common interests of Turkey and Israel on national security and in relation to imaginable regional threats. Despite some doubts during the first ten years of the 21st century and the rule of Justice and Development in Turkey, especially after the start of the Syria war, the strategic relation between Turkey and Israel, and according to Walt, their cooperative relations (informal) and relying on formal relations and treaties of the 1990s once again introduced the two countries as strategic allies in terms of realism.

2. Turkey and the Political Process of Westernization

Turkey, with an area about half the area of Iran, is located in the westernmost part of Asia, with only 3% of its territory in Europe. That is of the total area of 779452 square kilometers, only 24378 square kilometers is in Europe. But since 1923 that the Republic of Turkey was formed, Turkey has always pursued its goal and dream of part of the political geopolitics of Europe and the West.[9] Turkey has a common border with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (Azerbaijan) which was part of the former Soviet Union, Greece and Bulgaria.[10] Thus, at least until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey position in the geopolitical dealing with the Soviet Union was faded, but at the present time, with the annexation of the Crimea to Russia by the Moscow government, Turkey position is becoming more prominent in that region, because tension and, ultimately, the war between Ukraine and its Russian insurgents, the Moscow embargo by the West, and Moscow's continued military movements in that region could clarify the prospect of Turkey's special position. Putin's recent trip to Ankara in September 2017 and

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[9] Selman Yilmaz. State, politics, and religion: effects of political and social change on the relationship between state and religion in Turkey, 2002-2012. Dissertation. Department of sociology. University of Pittsburgh. 2013; Selman Yilmaz. Social mobility and its discontents: the center-periphery cleavage of Turkey. Journal of history culture and art research, 3(2), 28-44. 2014. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.7596/taksad.v3i2.356

[10] Jalil Roshandel, Ibid, pp. 116-130 / "Israel / Turkey: Defense Axis", Oxford Analytical Daily Brief, Oxford, December 16, 1997. - / "Interview with UN or", Tel Aviv, Oct. 1997, Middle East Journal, vol.52, no.2, spring 1998.

his efforts to attract Turkish leaders' attention to Ankara's neutral position regarding the Ukrainian crisis make Turkey's position more attractive in the West camp.

After the occupation of the city of Thessaloniki (one of the present Greek and former Ottoman cities) by the Greeks at the end of the Ottoman Empire, many Turks and Jewish merchants migrated to Istanbul. The emergence of Theodor Herzl and Zionism leadership was not so much effective in the unity and progress of the Jews.[11] The main reason for the empowerment and prosperity of Zionism in the world is the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the rise of its power in the 1930s.[12] This means that Jews made a historic opportunity from a massive threat to themselves. Close relations between Turks in the republic continued with the Jews. During this period, among the supporters of the Judaism, Atatürk, Abraham Galanti and Tekinalp (Moise Cohen) were more prominent. Tekinalp, author of the famous book "Kemalism", who expressed the Atatürk's features. He was the one who called the Atatürk nationalism peaceful and encouraging the political participation of ethnic elements and considered this ideology necessary for the development of the country.[13] Obviously Westernization has been one of the main principles of Tekinalp (Moise Cohen) for the expansion of Kemalism, which defines Turkey entirely in the West camp. The Republic of Turkey, in contrast to the Ottoman regime, which had relations with the West based on distrust and misunderstandings, developed close relations with it, in a way that its foreign policy priority was from the beginning of its proximity to the West, and especially to Europe.[14] For Atatürk and the young Turkic population, Europe was the manifestation of progress and civilization, and joining to it and becoming part of Europe (the West) was their main goal.[15] The origins of Turkey's foreign policy can be searched in three variables. History, geography and geopolitical position and economics. (Tahaei, 2001, p. 228) Turkish foreign policy enforcers since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, supported with the loyalty and stability of the principles of Turkish foreign policy, which is derived from the Kemalism Westernization thinking. The principles of Kemalism, which are the compass of Turkish foreign policy, are introduced as follows: a state with all nations[16] (for this reason they recognized Israel and have maintained their relationship with it), peace in the interior and in the world, Turkey does not have an eternal enemy (the high capacity to improve relations with any hostile country) and the development of a national policy in line with the internal structure of Turkey.

From the point of view of the Kemalists, the credibility of the West manifested in military power, and Turkey can only attain a position when it follows the West, and this sought that military power from the eighteenth century was transformed in favor of the West and Christian Europe.[17] Neglecting Islamic-Middle Eastern identity within the framework of Kemalism logic was on the agenda, and the proximity policy was seriously pursued with the West, and especially the United States.[18] All the governments that ruled in Turkey from 1923 to the mid-1980s considered the alignment with the interests of the United States, both in the region

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[11] Jalil Roshandel, Ibid., Pp. 116-130

[12] Umut Uzer, "The Crisis in the Relations between Turkey and Israel", Translated by Hamed Pourhassan, Regional Studies Quarterly: American Studies-Israel Studies, Winter 2012, pp. 77-105.

[13] Umut Uzer, ibid., pp. 116-130

[14] Rasoul Afzali, Majid Hosseini, "The Study of Geopolitical Developments in Turkey and Its Impact on Iran," Tehran, The Geopolitics Quarterly, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 151-176 / Bali Aykan, Mehmet (1996), "Turkish perspectives is the Turkish-US relation regarding Persian Gulf security in the post-cold war era: 1982-1995; Middle East Journal, vol. 50, No.3. / Efraim Inbar (2001), "Regional implication of the Israeli Turkish strategic partnership"; MERIP, journal, Vol.5, No.2.

[15] Rasoul Afzali, Majid Hosseini, ibid.

[16] Rasoul Afzali, Majid Hosseini, ibid.

[17] Ibid., p. 40

[18] Ibid., p. 41

and in the global arena as the main key. It was believed that Turkey's national interests would surely be met with the alignment of the US leadership.[19]

3. Pragmatism of Turkey in the West Bloc

The Kemalists did not recognize the definition of the national interests of Turkey in the framework of interests of the United States not only harmful for the independence of the country, but also considered as the guarantor of the independence of Turkey, which brings an important regional and global place for Turkey, which the strength of international maneuver and internal stability are among its results.[20] Kemalists considered avoiding alignment with the West as a risk, and, targeted becoming US satellite contrary to many countries in the region. According to Robert Ruttin at Columbia University: "Small powers have always far from security due to lack of security, but also they become dependent due to lack of security."[21] Kemalists, in contrast to the Ottoman state, which in the last two centuries of its life, imposed its foreign policy on maintaining a balance between the two powers in Europe (on the one hand, France, the United Kingdom and Russia, and on the other hand, Germany and Austria). They followed the West instead of balance policy.[22] Joining NATO was done based on the same policy that led to the Soviet enmity and the opposition of so-called Arab regional revolutionary states. By the mid-1980s, Ankara's leaders, with the support of the military forces had established their policies so that due to structural inequalities with the West, there was no opportunity for Turkey to achieve its real status in the region and the world. So first, internal development has to be made to be able to pursue independent policies afterwards, and by ignoring the Ottoman experience, considered following the West, led by the United States, useful in all internal and external fields to realize a modern society and achieve regional and global position.[23] The first Arab victories in the war against Israel in 1948, after the announcement of the formation of Israel, placed Turkey entirely on the Arab front, until the Israeli forces eventually won the Arab armies and persuaded Turkey to change politics.[24] Turkey's accession to the Palestinian reconciliation commission by the United Nations was a sign of Turkey's greater closeness to the West. With the collapse of Britain after World War II, the United States paid much more attention to Turkey in the wake of Truman's doctrine of filling England empty place.[25] The victories of Israel on the armies of the Arab countries followed Turkey's inner acclaim and made Ankara to think of a further proximity to Israel which was the new military power in the region.

On the other hand, in 1950, Turkey, with the appointment of a minister in Tel Aviv, showed that Israel's identification was not just a political compromise on their part, but could begin a major partnership in a region in which Turkey sees itself alone in the midst of the unfortunate Arabs from a very short time Ottoman Empire at that time, empowering Iran, and of course, the Soviet Union, its biggest threats and became partner with the West with leadership of the United States to deal with threats and Israel, which received the largest support from the United States, and the Jewish lobby also was the arm of Israeli influence in the United States could be an opportunity for Turkey to support economic, technological, and military capabilities of the United States in the fight against Soviet communism in particular.[26] Ankara's support in that early period of the formation of Israel went so far as to protest Egypt in closing the Suez

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[19] Ibid., p.42
[20] Hossein Daheshyar, "Pakistanization of Turkey", Tehran, Economic Political Information, No. 288, Summer 2012, p. 40.
[21] Ibid.,
[22] Hossein Daheshyar, former, p. 40
[23] Ibid., p. 43
[24] Bourhan Pollat, "Turkey and the Zionist Regime: Past, Present and Future", Translated by Elias Wahedi, Cultural Institute for International Studies and Studies of Abrar Moaser, March 2008, p. 58.
[25] Ibid., p. 60
[26] Ibid.,

Canal on Israeli ships, and in 1954 the Turkish Prime Minister, in its trip to Washington, made Jamil Abdel Nasser to introduce Turkey angered by Arabs due to its support of Israel.[27]

But after the Justice Party led by Süleyman Demirel got into power in 1965, the Turkish government set its foreign policy goal for close and effective cooperation in most areas with Muslim and Arab governments in the Middle East and North Africa, but Turkey did not receive support from Islamic countries for its position on Cyprus in the United Nations.[28] Right before the Arabs-Israel war in 1967, Turkey silenced when Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba to transit goods to Israel, assuring Egypt that it would not allow NATO to use the war on Egypt.

Moreover, while Turkey called for the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the occupied territories during the 1967 war, never described Israel as an aggressor.[29] Turkey reused to annex East Jerusalem to Israel in following 1967 war, but kept its consulate open until 1980, as long as Kent introduced Jerusalem as its capital. At that time, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel considered the Israeli action illegitimate, false, and opposed to international law and justice, saying that Jerusalem should not be in Israeli hands.[30]

In fact, Turkey was struggling to reconstruct its position in the West, with the adoption of multiple positions, on war 1967, because, despite the support of Egypt, by refusing to join the navies, it called for the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba on Israeli ships, and supported the resolution 241 of the United Nations who called for the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and the return of peace and security to all the countries of the region at internationally recognized borders, including Israel.[31] This approach can be evaluated as a more Western-oriented approach to the interests of Israel, a policy that upholds the proverb "runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds". Israel, after deciding to develop its military industrial complex in the 1970s, was faced with the financial problems it needed, the necessity to focus on exports of weapons was raised and finding strategic partners to sell arms became important.[32]

4.   Neo-Westernization: Turkey After Cold War

Turkey's westernized foreign policy in the 1990s was the continuation of Turkey's Westernizing policy during the Cold War. In the 1990s, Turkey's inclination to enter regional issues was at its lowest.[33] Most people in Turkey want democracy-globalism for their country, and they ask their statesmen to interfere popular values in foreign policy.[34] Efraim Inbar mentioned in his Israeli security book that Turkey was one of Israel's new strategic allies in the 1990s. By the 1990s, the Turkish government had a long-standing desire to establish relations with Turkey to change the religious nature of the Middle East crisis that Israel has no problem with Muslims and Muslim countries, and is also associated with a large non-Arab Muslim country.[35] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkish policy changed in the Middle East. The country sought a more important position in the region, and ignoring Israel was not possible. Turkey's earthquake has been a good

[27] Saeed Khatibzadeh, ibid.,
[28] Michel B. Blshku, "How has Turkey viewed Israel", 2006., op. cit.
[29] Ibid.,
[30] Ibid.,
[31] Saeed Khatibzadeh, "Turkey and Israel: Towards a New Security-Political Framework", Tehran, Foreign Policy Quarterly, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 412.
[32] Neill Lochery, "Israel and Turkey: deepening ties and strategic implications, 1995- 98", Israel affairs, Vol.5, No.1 (autumn 1998), PP. 45-62-/ Dror Marom, "Irvy Signs Israel- Turkey Defense Co-operation Agreement", Israel Business Arena, August 1996.-/ Ran Dagoni, "Israel and Turkey Set to Produce Popeye Missile", Israel Business Arena, 28 May 1997.
[33] Gholamali Chegini Zadeh, Behzad Khosandam, "Interaction and Confrontation between Peripherality and Westernization in Turkish Foreign Policy", Tehran, Strategic Quarterly, No. 55, Summer 2010, p. 190
[34] Ibid.,
[35] Efraim Inbar, "Israel's Security", Defense Strategy Quarterly, Year 6, No. 2, Autumn 2008, p. 87

opportunity for Israel's proximity to Turkey in1992. With the beginning of diplomatic relations, the two countries' military relations expanded in 1992. In 1996, senior officials of the two parties met and concluded various military contracts for the modernization of Turkish military equipment.[36]

On the other hand, Turkey, which saw its strategic position in the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was struggling to maintain its special position for the United States by signing strategic treaties with Israel. For this reason, following the upgrading of the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel, in 1991, meetings between the two sides took place, such as the visit of the Israeli Defense Minister to Ankara in 1993, the trip of Turkish Foreign Minister to Israel in 1993, and the other issues that ultimately led to the conclusion of strategic military security contracts between Israel and Turkey in 1996.[37] By concluding a Turkish-Israeli military-security agreement that the United States also had its special support because it was willing to show the Middle East and the world that in addition to the United States, Israel has a supporter and reliable partner called Turkey.[38] Apart from the various goals that Turkey and Israel had in concluding a joint military-security agreement, their shared goals were very much in the decision to contract, such as common influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, confronting Islamists, and using water resources in the region, and addressing common regional threats.[39] During the Cold War, Turkey relied on the Alliance of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect its national security. However, in the 1990s, Turkey faced growing security challenges from its neighbors in the Middle East. The end of the Cold War reduced the proportion of the NATO coalition to Turkey in countering the security challenges by its neighbors. It pushed Turkey to new allies in the region.[40] The Turkish coalition with Israel has been the product of this reasoning of the Turkish Army that Israel is our best partner in the region, and as a result, any attempt by Iran to eliminate the coalition in the political arena is likely to be problematic.[41]

5.   Turkey and Neo-Islamism

Before the start of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) leadership in 2002, the second intifada in the fall of 2000 put the Turkish government in a difficult situation. On the other hand, because of the benefits of security- military cooperation and agreements, it did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Israel, but on the other hand it could not ignore the suffering of the Palestinians, who were the most loyal Arabs to the Ottoman Empire.[42] The result was a soft and lenient handling of the Turkish government and the sharp reaction of the Turkish press against Israel, which Tel Aviv did not remain silent, and with the offer of Yossi Sarid, the education minister for Armenian genocide identification, responded to the Turkish reaction, and the Turkish protest was not effective, and a few months later Ehud Tuledano, the Israeli ambassador to Ankara, who also accused Turkey of genocide, that this means Ankara's relation with Tel Aviv is not as good as the past and is in crisis.[43] A few days after the triumph of justice and development in the 2002 Turkish elections, Murat Mercan, the deputy of the AKP, despite his previous criticism of Ariel Sharon, said that the strategic relationship between Turkey and Israel would not change, and that the religious and

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[36] Ibid.,

[37] Gholamali Chegini Zadeh, Behzad Khosandam, former.

[38] Jalil Roshandel, former, pp. 116-120.

[39] Ibid.,

[40] Banu Eligur, "Crises in Turkish- Israeli relations (December 2008-june 2011): from partnership to enmity", Middle Eastern studies, vol. 48, no. 3, May 2012, PP. 429-459.

[41] Neill Lochery, Op. cit., P.50

[42] Majid Eskandari, "A Study of the Objectives and Fields of the Formation of Turkey's Alliance and the Zionist Regime in the Nineties and subsequent Developments", Tehran, Defense Policy Magazine No. 72, Autumn 2010, pp. 227-230.

[43] Majid Eskandari, former.

ideological concerns under the AKP regime don't determine the foreign policy of Turkey.[44] The AKP leaders, who also had experience of being in the Welfare Party, knew that they could not behave like the ideals of Erbakan's Welfare Party in foreign policy, otherwise they would not expect anything other than a white coup that dismissed Erbakan.

After the triumph of the Justice and Development Party in 2002, Turkish troops, which until then had been undisputable power to Turkish domestic policy, assured their Israeli counterparts that they would preserve Turkish foreign policy and security and, as forced Erbakan to resign in 1997.[45] Ankara's lack of cooperation in the US invasion to Iraq, which was opposed to the target of Israel, i.e. Iraq, was weakened, the dispute between Turkey and Israel became apparent, and Israel also declared support for Iraqi Kurds. Perez, Sharon and Obama's efforts failed to close the positions of the two countries.[46] During the 2006 Lebanon War, Erdogan strongly opposed the Israeli attacks, but also announced that he will stand alongside Israel and the United States against the dangers threatening the region, after which chose General Yasar Buyukanit, who is interested in the military system of Israel and America, as the commander of the Turkish Army, but on the other hand also welcomed Khaled Mashaal, the Hamas political leader, who exasperated the Israelis and confirmed the pursuit of Turkey's continued policy of keeping up appearances in the Middle East and the region, but a common strategic position with Israel against common threats was also kept.[47] The actions of the Justice and Development Party at the head of the Turkish government from the beginning of regime was not self-governing and independent, but rather slowly set the condition for their own conservative regime. In the November 2002 parliamentary elections, Justice and Development Party, which was founded by Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seized the majority of parliament seats.[48] Both Gul and Erdogan defended the European Parliament membership at the time and sought good relations with all Western countries. This trend was affecting European and American politicians and media elites.[49]

Erdogan and his followers established courageous relations with Israel and sought to reduce the influence of the military as the largest supporter of strategic ties with Israel by changing the rules, and by moving to Syria they tried to control the Kurds, and by moving towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia, tried to confront the influence of Shiites in Iraq. In the 33-day war, Lebanon maintained its neutral role by adopting a policy of criticizing Israel and not supporting Hezbollah. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was trying to quell the crisis by traveling to Syria and Israel.[50] The relationship between Turkey and Israel is a traditional relation in the region[51], which means that its life has never been threatened. But still, it was not flawless. The recent most accelerated issue was Gaza flotilla raid.

These ships, organized by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İHH), were carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials, with the intention of breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. Israel had warned the flotilla to abort their mission, describing it as a provocation. The organization refused the call and Israel aggressively assault on civilians. The incident had broken relations between Israel and Turkey for many years. Finally, in 2013, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu officially apologized on behalf of his nation to Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on a telephone exchange between them. By 2016, Israel paid 20 million Dollars compensation for whom suffered this raid.

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[44] Michel B. Blshku, Op. cit.
[45] Majid Eskandari, former, pp. 231-235
[46] Ibid.,
[47] Majid Eskandari, former, pp. 231-235
[48] Michel B. Blshku, Op. cit., PP. 135-138.
[49] Ibid.,
[50] Murad Weisi, "The Sixth War of Arabs and Israel," Tehran, Kheili Door Kheili Nazdik journal, pp. 90-94.
[51] Ibid.

## 6.	Westernization: The Common Denominator of Israel-Turkey Relation

Certainly, at a time when Israel was formed, not Turkey was fully run democratically, nor Israel, was entirely in the western bloc, but over time, Turkey became more democratic and showed Westernized tendencies.[52] The close relations of the Jews with Turkey during the republic continued like the Ottoman period; during the Ottoman era, many Jews fled to Istanbul by the Greeks after the Thaloniki conquest. At the time of the Nazis, many Jews, even their elites, took refuge in Turkey, and enjoyed an atmosphere of reverence in science and humanity in modern Turkey, and many of them were attracted to the universities of Istanbul.[53] The Westernization of these Jews was very important for the newly established Turkish republic, which had an aspiration for Westernization. In terms of assessing the relationship between the two governments of the Republic of Turkey and the newly established state of Israel with secularization rights (as the basis of government in the West), however Israel didn't enter the religious law of Judaism into civil law, which is very much considered in ordinary life, but in Turkey, where its civil law is inspired by the Swiss Civil Code and was prepared by Mahmut Bozkurt, it completely closed the way for entry of Sharia laws into the modern legal system, secularism is stronger than Israel.[54] Secularism, as the indicator and theoretical foundation of the rule in the West, forms the basis of the rule of the two countries. Despite the anti-Communistic basis and Turkey joining the Baghdad treaty, this membership was not in the interest of Israel, because the royal Iraq, with its proximity to Turkey, strengthened the Turkey's position against Israel. But Israel opted for the path to patience, which ended in its favor against the Turkey non-friendly measures, because after the collapse of the kingdom of Iraq, the Baghdad treaty was virtually eliminated, and Turkey by being far from Baghdad, which had very close relations with the Soviet Union at that time, after the secret negotiations with Israel, concluded a peripheral treaty.[55] Basically, Soviet proximity to the Arab revolutionary regimes served as a major driver of Turkey's closer proximity to the West and to Israel. In the sixties, which was the decade of Cyprus's crisis for Turkey, Turkish foreign policy was totally affected by this caused the domestic protests against lack of dynamism of foreign policy. The Turkish government revealed its relation with Israel to calm these internal protests and withdrawal of Turkey from international isolation, but continued its spiritual support for the Palestinians.[56] Turkish Foreign Minister, Chaghla Yangel, said in 1967 in defense of his country's relationship with Israel: It's impossible to execute the idea of the enemy be my enemy, and Turkey has a clear-cut relation with Israel, and it has never been against the Arabs.[57] It was very important for Turkey to stand in the middle in the Cold War. In the case of the 1967 war, Turkey decided to call for the reinstatement of the occupied territories, but refused to recognize Israel as an aggressor on the basis of UN decisions, while at the same time of adopting resolution 242 as its position, it tried to choose a moderate solution, according to its traditional strategy.[58] With the measures and supports of the US government, especially the US Department of Defense and influential Jewish American and American politicians such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Morton Abramovich for the proximity of Israel and Turkey that for example, in the late Cold War, in 1989, the American Committee of Israeli affairs played a significant role in the recognition of the Armenian genocide by Turkey.[59] In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Turkey's Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit opted to reopen the PLO office in Turkey. By establishing

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[52] Umut Uzer, former, pp. 87-92.
[53] Umut Uzer, former, pp. 87-92.
[54] Ibid.,
[55] Saeid Khatibzadeh, former, p. 415.
[56] Borhan Pollat, former, pp. 60-65
[57] Ibid.,
[58] Ibid.,
[59] Umut Uzer, former, pp. 93-96.

ties with Israel at the level of the ambassador in the early 1990s, at the same time, he opened the Palestinian Embassy a swell to pursue a clear-cut policy of balance.[60]

7.   Conclusion

Turkey was formed after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by allied forces in the World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which had a long struggle with the West. The founders of the new Turkish Republic tried to impose Western values on the state and the Ottoman society many years before the formation of the Republic of Turkey. For example, after Sultan Abdul Hamid, the young Turks provided the ground for Jewish immigration to Palestine and, collaborated with Western countries, especially Germany to modernize the infrastructure of the country. After the Turkish Republic was formed, Kemalism, which followed the fully-Western pattern, during the Cold War, with Turkey's membership in NATO, introduced recognition of Israel by Turkey as the first Muslim country and its anti-Soviet opposition as a Western bloc, and in the 90's after the Cold War, with a strategic alliance with Israel, tried to maintain its position with the United States and its allies. In the first 10 years of the 21st century, the AKP government always adhered to its commitments to the West, and sometimes had a controversy with the West and political tension with Israel on Palestinian issue, especially Gaza, which never led to the despair of the West from Turkey. But after the Syrian war, with a thought close to the Kemalists' values of the Cold War, it decided to collapse the Syrian government and Bashar al-Assad, and in this way, he worked especially with the United States and Israel. Israel, as owes its birth to the Western governments, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, and was established by some rulers with the Western background and began to act on the international stage, was not only alongside the Western bloc of the Cold War, but also through Jewish lobby which had a special influence in the most powerful country of the West i.e. the United States, which up to now has required the United States to commit itself to maintaining Israel's security. Both Turkey and Israel, despite any seemingly political tensions, have maintained their Western-oriented relations in the world and the region, which forms the basis of their relationship and cooperation.

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[60] Ibid.

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